Author: bcubbage

  • Non-TV Party Tonight!

    Non-TV Party Tonight!

    Day 4 of Lent

    My post is a bit lighter tonight. And shorter. I have been invited to a party tonight, and I am actually going to it. In my quiet world, this is a big event.

    I am a rather extreme introvert. A TV party is normally about as much party as I care to handle:

    As most of you know (or maybe you don’t), introversion is not a matter of liking or disliking social interaction. I like and enjoy being around people, although I am a bit socially awkward on top of my introversion; conversations are hard, especially with strangers. Being an extrovert or introvert, though, is a matter of whether one is energized by social interaction or drained by it. Extroverts need social interaction to gain energy; too much isolation and extroverts wither. Introverts like me, by contrast, get their energy from alone time, from isolated pursuits, from books and ideas and thought. We like and need social interaction, too– we get awfully lonely without it. The difference, though, is that social interaction takes energy from us, and eventually we will need to withdraw into solitude to recharge.

    I am very much the introvert. I test off the chart for introversion. I bury the introversion needle. I don’t get as much alone time as I really need, so I really relish the alone time I get. Today has, so far, been stellar in that respect. I knew it had to be, because tonight I will be around a lot of people, many of whom I do not know. They will be fun, and I will enjoy myself, but without a day on my own I would have arrived running on empty.

    Before social engagements, I always go through a familiar roller-coaster social anxiety ritual prior to the time they start. For a long time it paralyzed me. Now I just know that it is how I put my social face on, and so I just shrug and indulge myself. It looks roughly like this:

    Accepting the invitation: Wow, I bet that will be really fun! I am really flattered just to have been asked.

    The day before: Oh yes, I did say I was going to do that. Should be good. What do I need to make sure I get myself ready?

    T-4 hours: [Twinge of anxiety] I need to do dishes and laundry and finish all my other chores. What if I never come home from this thing? I don’t want my next of kin to find the place a total wreck.

    T-3 hours: [Anxiety building] Oh man oh man it would be so nice to lie in bed and watch TV for six or seven hours. It looks so cozy!

    T-2 hours: [Anxiety pretty acute now] I can’t believe I agreed to do this. Everyone will see what a stick in the mud I am and I will end up looking like Chris Farley on The Chris Farley Show:

    T-1 hour: [Anxiety cresting, giving way to exhausted numbness] I have lived a life without regret. I never did mop my kitchen floor. I just hope my family won’t make fun of my housekeeping over my open casket.

    T-5 minutes: [Trancelike state] I am clever. I can always play my “smart guy” act. That always seems to go over pretty well, although I have been losing viewers lately in the key 25-34 demographic. My material about Murder, She Wrote just doesn’t pop like it used to.

    T+whenever the event is over: That was really fun. I really had a good time. I am flattered that I was invited to do that.

    Now that this ritual has played itself out so many times, always with the same result, I now greet it. If I start getting terrified and desperately want to back out, it means that by all means I need to go forward.

    To all of you socially adept non-introverts out there: Next time you are at a party or other social function, keep an eye out for the introverts. Say hi to us. We like talking to you. Make due allowances for the fact that it may have taken a lot for us just to get there. When we get home, we will remember you kindly.

    Have a good evening, everybody. And I promise I will come back to mop the kitchen floor.

  • Hoc Est Corpus Meum: Juridical Legitimacy and Somatic Truth

    Hoc Est Corpus Meum: Juridical Legitimacy and Somatic Truth

    Day 3 of Lent

    As early Christianity transitioned from a persecuted religious sect in the Roman world to the official religion of empire, the burgeoning institutional church began to manifest its newfound status in church buildings. In the Roman West, one of the earliest formats for the church copied the Roman basilica. The basilica was, in the Roman world, a sort of public meeting place, a combination of marketplace and City Hall. It was also the seat of the law courts and of jurisprudence.

    Characteristic of the design of the basilica was the apse– an area, sometimes elevated, located at the end of the long, rectangular building. It was at these ends that Roman judges, in their seats of authority, would hear cases at law.

    When Christians adapted the form of the basilica for their churches, the apse housed the altar. Where else to house the sacerdotal authority of the priest to say the Mass than in the seat where the Roman judge passed judgment?

    I have often thought about the peculiar resonances of this history: the way that the patterns of juridical and sacerdotal authority overlap in it, the latter mimicking the former. For congregants celebrating a Mass in the earliest basilicas, it would be hard not to hear echoes and see reflections of the Roman judge, and the political order he represented, in the words and actions of the celebrant priest.

    In our time, this blurring of performative roles seems odd and quaint. We have thoroughly differentiated the marketplace, the court of law, the public meeting-place, and the church. Yet, when we look more closely, Christianity in our own time is full of such blurred roles, of practices of legitimating authority that stem from nothing more than (seemingly natural) legitimation practices in culture generally.

    *******

    I say this as a prelude to a line of thought I have been pursuing for some time now regarding the way Christianity in the United States has handled issues of LGBTQ inclusion, a line of thought that is generally critical. The conversation within Christian churches regarding LGBTQ persons, and the full range of sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender and sexual expression they represent, has tended, disappointingly, to focus almost exclusively on issues of inclusion and recognition. Can LGBTQ persons be fully themselves and still identify as Christian? Can they enjoy membership, fellowship, and communion? Can they participate in roles of lay leadership? Can they be called to positions of ordained ministry?

    Generally this conversation is framed in terms of broad theological considerations (about moral boundaries, Biblical authority, love, inclusion, welcome, and hospitality), of which the church’s response to LGBTQ persons would be a particular case. In a way, this way of proceeding is understandable. In a situation that presents a problem or challenge to traditional understanding and practice, one way to handle it is to reflect on matters of general principle, and then allow one’s actions to be guided by whatever principles seem most compelling. It is responsible, “principled.”

    More often than not, such a discussion takes on the flavor of a juridical proceeding, much like a case in law. Sometimes, the different “sides” to the discussion engage in a dispute over facts, or seek to enter different facts into evidence. As often as not, though, the dispute is not over questions of material fact but (in keeping with the analogy) questions of law—that is to say, considerations of principle from the perspective of which the disputes over fact gain relevance.

    The discussion over LGBTQ folk in church then becomes an exercise in theological adjudication. Which considerations control in this case, and how do those considerations apply to it in such a way as to guide our conduct? Does the principle of radical love and hospitality control? Or is it the principle of Biblical literalism (filtered, of course, through a selective, unacknowledged interpretive lens)? Is it some balanced approach between the two? What does the high court of theological reflection deem to be the best effective answer to the questions of principle, and what instructions does it issue to us on remanding the matter back to us to implement?

    Of course the debate over LGBTQ persons within Christianity at large isn’t a formal juridical proceeding. It might be capable of being resolved more effectively if it were. But there is a very real sense in which the dynamic of the discussion, especially within academic and institutional contexts, works like one. In church contexts in particular, the “issue” we queer folk present is often, in point of fact, a matter of determining official formalities: Of resolutions and motions debated by official bodies that relate to the granting of titles and offices. In other words, the discussion is not about whether LGBTQ persons are right with God in the abstract, but instead whether we can be members of congregations, or can be ordained to church offices, or receive sacraments such as marriage. The discussions of our standing before God routinely take place in the context of specific demands we might make, or be expected to make, for recognition and privileges granted by church institutions. Of course, broader discussions of principle also happen in individual congregations, in seminaries, and increasingly in debates online. But outside a philosophy classroom it is rare in my experience for there to be a sustained discussion about our existence that isn’t tied to some claim about how authorities should treat us.

    We like this juridical way of proceeding. It is familiar to us from legal and political institutions in our larger culture. It is clearly about something important; institutional privileges and recognition matter. But limiting the discussion to those things has a subtle way of invalidating what we say on our own behalf and in our own voices. It turns us into pleaders, parties to the case. If that is so, certainly we can’t also be among the judges; that is patently unfair. Of course we think we are valid, that we belong and have something to contribute; that is the claim to be adjudicated, the question at bar. What is needed, so a juridical model like this one suggests, is an impartial judge, someone to decide between the parties but who isn’t one of them. We must await the judges’ recognition that our identity is valid, speak only when it is our turn to speak. The judges will then judge, and it is our job to remain quiet and wait for the judges to rule. The rarefied air of general theological principle, it is presumed, is orientation-blind, just as it is supposedly gender-blind, color-blind, and blind to everything else but who God is and what is essential to humanity.

    Yet who speaks on behalf of this gender-blind, color-blind, and orientation-blind point of view? Who is somehow deemed sufficiently impartial and hence the best judge of everyone else’s claims? In practice, it turns out to be straight white men, since they are thought to have no axes to grind, no special pleading to make. They are the functionaries of the asexual, genderless, raceless, dispassionate God, themselves without meaningful race or gender or sexual orientation. To read them as raced, gendered, or sexed is to play “identity politics.” In the specific case of us LGBTQ folk, we may appeal to less-than-ideal judges: women (who are gendered), people of color (who are raced), just so long as they are straight.

    I think that much of this lies behind the phenomenon of “professional LGBTQ allies,” both within the church and without. This is not to say that allies mean to do this, nor that allies are not welcome or valuable. What happens, though, is that straight allies perform a legitimating function in theological discussions, rendering LGBTQ concerns decent and respectable, telling other straight folk that we are OK, mediating our voices to them. Straight allies do not themselves create this mode of production; they merely serve a function within it.

    This mode of production is not restricted to the discussion of LGBTQ persons in Christianity, either. It also informs the discussion of women and gender in Christianity. (It also informs discussions of race everywhere, both inside Christian contexts and outside of it; I will have to focus on that in another post.) If you aren’t aware of how Christian culture delegitimizes women’s voices, I suggest you read and dwell alongside the women in my blogroll at right who blog about women in Christian culture, and in particular “progressive” and “emergent” Christian culture. Evangelical Christian culture is tirelessly, endlessly creative in its patriarchy, of course. Of late, though, the discussion has turned towards the fact that, while “progressive” and “emergent” Christians talk a good game about inclusion, equality, radical hospitality, and the like, the ones who actually dominate the discussion of the good game and tell us what its rules are tend to be—you guessed it—straight white men. Well educated straight white men, in fact. Straight white men have an easier time in that world getting invited to speak at conferences, getting published, getting a readership, getting traction for what they say. Some of them also prove remarkably brittle when they are called on this reality.

    My take on this phenomenon is that, again, we see the juridical model at work. The ideal judges will look on women’s experience, and queers’ experience, and tell us better than we can what it all means. We are of course too close to it ourselves. It is as close to us as our own bodies; it is written in our most secret places. How could we possibly get past all that and say anything that is plainly true?

    *******

    What the juridical model misses is that outside of discursive practices, outside of books and public talks, there is somatic truth: the truth of bodies, of concrete practices, of labor and life, of who gets to speak, and when; of the ways our voices sound, the curves of our elbows and hips, the look of a lover drinking us in, the flat look of love that has grown cold. The order of somatic truth is rich and tightly knit. People who are not straight, not white, and not male are better able to testify to this order of somatic truth than those who fall on the privileged side of these axes for the reason that they disrupt the tacit somatic truth of the dominant culture. We constantly trip over its unexpressed rules. Its operations are for us a daily reality we have to know about in order to survive.

    We may be culturally on the margins, but somatically we are right here. We are in your neighborhoods and your churches. We are next to you in the classroom, on the street, at the movies. We are in your families. It doesn’t take much to find us. We have gifts to share with you. Our bodies not only take up space, but occupy space, and that space contains life. Of course, you have gifts to share with us, too; your lives enmesh with ours. Your truth is also a somatic one, whether you acknowledge it or not. Yet we know a lot about your somatic truth, since it surrounds us all the time. We don’t need to learn more about yours. You need to learn more about ours.

    The juridical model has trouble with somatic truth, since somatic truth does not need juridical permission to exist. Somatic truth has purchase on us directly, in the encounter with the other person. It is a claim of bodies upon bodies. Some of us, in that encounter, are open to it, are transformed by it. Others have the utmost difficulty responding to the humanity of the other person, the legitimacy of their embodied experience, without a court order (as it were), and even then they will refuse to see it.

    Yet it is in this somatic encounter that I believe Jesus meets us as well—the God-man, the child of the illegitimate extralegal union of God and the Virgin, the one who routinely breaks every law and every rule, the one whose body is broken and blood is spilled and yet returns again and again whenever that breaking and spilling is remembered in his name. Jesus can meet us just on the other side of the law; perhaps it is the only place he ever does meet us. And everyone already has a place in that encounter.

  • Too Much of Not Enough

    Too Much of Not Enough

    Day 2 of Lent: Valentine’s Day

    Last night I promised you, gentle readers, a rant. This post is not what I had in mind. I am still working on that one, although I am increasingly ambivalent about it. Probably why I should post it, actually, but it just isn’t ready yet. For starters, I really need to read a lot more Max Weber on rationalization first. That is, if I want to cover the ol’ bases.

    Instead, I am home. I am in bed under several blankets because my furnace is busted, and I won’t get a new one until tomorrow. It is 56 degrees in here, but I am surprisingly comfortable. I am at home alone tonight after teaching my philosophy class, and that experience evokes a lot of unresolved things for me.

    I decided at the age of fifteen that I wanted to be a philosophy professor. I went to college with that ambition firmly in mind, and I was only scarcely tempted to abandon it once or twice. I dutifully proceeded to a Ph.D. program; it was difficult, but I persevered, finished, and in 2002 received my doctorate. I entered a very tight job market, and that fact, coupled with the adjunct teaching I was doing and a research program I found increasingly tiresome, did me in. In 2008, I quit the search for viable full-time academic employment. Since the academy kills its wounded, especially in such a tight market, I left on the expectation that the academic door was definitively closed.

    In fall of 2012, I returned to part-time university teaching. This time, I have absolutely no expectation whatsoever that it will lead to any kind of career. I am simply not viable as a job candidate, and I can’t afford to work as a full-time adjunct. The compensation for my current teaching, while very good by local adjunct standards, still shocks most non-academic people when I describe it to them. They have no idea that people with MA’s and Ph.D.’s settle for fixed-term contract work with no benefits, no job security, and pay that, if translated into an hourly rate, can range as low as $9-$10 per hour. It beats minimum wage, but an advanced degree is a steep price to pay for such a small benefit.

    Why do people do it, then? I can’t speak for other people, but I did it for two reasons before I abandoned hopes for an academic career. The first was that one pretty much has to do some adjunct teaching if one is on the job market, to prove that you are still inside the charmed circle. Otherwise, your academic CV gets gaps in it, and your job interviews all end up being about those rather than about you.

    The other reason was that I had grown to love the classroom and the life of a college teacher. I was not, and am not, a great classroom teacher. (I am not looking for validation here; I am simply not great. Not terrible, but not great.) But when it goes well in the classroom, nothing makes me feel as alive as that. It is a tremendous privilege to discuss ideas and books and engage in the give-and-take of a good discussion.

    Now that I have been out of the academy for four years and all rational hope of a career is gone, it is that love of teaching alone that has brought me back. I teach two nights a week. On my teaching nights, I routinely come home exhilarated, my head full of ideas, my anxieties about the rest of my rather messy life temporarily banished. I feel, despite all evidence to the contrary, like everything will somehow turn out fine.

    Then reality sets in. The reality is that, as much as I love classroom teaching, the way higher education works these days means that being a classroom teacher is never enough. Most institutions talk a good game about valuing quality teaching, but when something like 50-75% of undergraduate teaching is done by a contingent work force who is not paid enough to have a stake in the institution and has no say in its governance, the talk seems empty.

    Undergraduate education in universities is increasingly treated as a cost center in need of streamlining, not as a goal worth diverting additional resources towards. Part of this environment is fostered by armies of administrators who may or may not have much experience in, or commitment to, teaching or research. Add to this the increasing economic and political pressure to treat undergraduate education like a product to be sold and delivered to students along the most efficient market delivery vector, rather than as an experience in which students and faculty are called into question, shaped, and changed, and what I do largely begins to look like an inefficient dinosaur.

    In this environment, institutions retain their armies of adjuncts by holding out the ever-more-rare carrot of a tenure-eligible position or simply prevailing on their sheer love of their students– or their self-limiting conviction that they could never possibly do anything else. And in the end, even that self-sacrificial sort of behavior won’t be enough.

    So you may be surprised to learn that this is actually a Valentine’s Day post about love. (Bet you didn’t see that coming.)

    It isn’t about heart-shaped boxes or gilded cards or dinner with champagne. It is about how sometimes love simply isn’t enough. I love teaching, and if I was able to make a living at it, I like to think that I would eventually be a good teacher. But the reality is that I can’t make a living at it. The love that we adjuncts put into our work won’t be enough to make it worth it to increasingly rationalized institutions in higher education. (See? I really need to read more Weber.) Love is slippery and resists our attempts to hang a price tag on it. It is like the fresh air we breathe. This would be wonderful, but for the fact that, if you haven’t noticed, capitalism has little ability to place any value on that, either. It simply assumes that it is abundant and limitless, except of course, when it isn’t anymore. Its choices are to pull up stakes and befoul the air somewhere else, or else to start asking the hard question of why it keeps befouling the air in the first place.

    I am generally loath to point out problems without having some solutions, but in this case I am without clever ideas. All I know how to do is to keep doing what I love a couple of hours a week, and in doing so holding open a space, however small, in which someone, somewhere, is doing what he loves. For now it will have to be enough.

  • Philosophy as Nonviolence

    Philosophy as Nonviolence

    Today begins the first time I have taught a college philosophy course in almost five years. (I taught last semester, but it was a religious studies course titled “Religion, Ethics, and Environment.” More about that experience in another post.) I am a bit philosophically rusty, and truth be told I am of two minds about philosophy as a profession. Overall, though, I am excited.

    Preparing for this semester has gotten me thinking about what philosophy is for and why anyone would spend time and effort taking on the intellectual discipline it demands. I am going to be standing up in front of a room of skeptical students, who are paying, perhaps with borrowed money, to learn about this nebulous “philosophy” thing. I think they deserve the best and most honest account I can give them of why it is worth their time, their effort, and the interest on their non-dischargeable loans.

    It is notoriously difficult to state some one thing or set of things that characterizes everything that is done under the disciplinary umbrella of “philosophy.” All of it seems to involve asking difficult questions, trying to answer them, and learning to cope with the fact that the answers we give never quite exhaust the questions we ask. But you could say the same thing about the natural sciences. No scientist I know thinks that the difficult questions driving scientific inquiry have exhausted nature, much less whatever small sliver of it forms the focus of their individual research.Science, no less than philosophy, teaches us to cope with provisional answers to difficult questions.

    Perhaps it is in the types of questions philosophers ask– the “big” questions about justice, morality, what is ultimately real, God? In other words, perhaps philosophy is unique in virtue of its content? But plenty of other disciplines and people– political and religious leaders, scientists, and others– ask these same questions and proffer answers, but we don’t call what results “philosophy” in the sense that what I teach in my college class is called “philosophy.” Perhaps what those people do should be called philosophy, but it isn’t. Certainly most professional philosophers would contest that little to none of what those people do really counts as philosophy.

    There is probably a sophisticated descriptive account one could give of “philosophy” that would come close to demarcating what is philosophy from what is not. I am not sure what good it would do to have one, though, except as a tool for philosophy professors to use to justify their existence and their budget line items to skeptical administrators. After all, we philosophers are running way behind in generating patents and research grant funding for our institutions, so we have to earn our lunch somehow.

    You can see, of course, why I am reluctant to stand up in front of my students and tell them a story about what philosophy is whose real function is to beg them to give us a pass when they get elected to the state legislature and millionaires lobby them to defund stuff. Students can smell a sales pitch coming a million miles away.

    I have come around to the notion that what is most interesting and best about philosophy is not the “how” or the “what” of it, but rather a basic sense of value to which it commits us. Basically put, I have come to believe that taking on philosophy means to take on a commitment to nonviolence, to the notion that disagreements, even seemingly incommensurable ones, can be the subject of continuing conversation without having to resort to violence.

    I have a healthy skepticism of the notion that that conversation tends to converge, even at some ideal limit set on infinity, on an ideal rational consensus. You can postulate that if you want, but it is just one more set of assertions to throw into the conversation. The force of calling the commitment to nonviolence a commitment is that it isn’t obviously tied to anything immanent in the practice of conversation itself. It is, rather, tied to the encounter with embodied others, people who come before us in all their embodied vulnerability with claims and stories different than ours, claims we can either lie out beside our own or attempt to erase or efface through the tools of (physical and discursive) violence.

    Philosophy is an invitation to abandon violence and to embrace conversation. Given that our culture in the United States places far more stock in violence, philosophy goes against the grain. It is hard to “sell” that to people who have been taught for so long to choose violence. The only way to “sell” this invitation is to show what it looks like to accept it, with both its burdens and its joys.

  • 2013, and Back to the Keyboard

    2013, and Back to the Keyboard

    A few weeks ago, I wrote an open version of the year-in-review “Christmas letter.” At that time I related that, while I had started 2012 with a very definite agenda in mind, I lacked similar focus in 2013.

    It has been 2013 for a few days already, and I still don’t have a crystal-clear overarching life agenda. I have,succeeded in discerning, though, that more frequent writing has to be part of anything I do with myself this year. My closest and most candid friends in the world have told me repeatedly, “Brian, you need to write more.” This year, I have decided to believe them.

    With that in mind, I have resolved that in 2013 I am going to be more deliberate and frequent about blogging. I also hope to do other kinds of writing that I won’t publish here, but blogging will comprise a large portion of what I write. At its best, blogging has gotten me in touch with intelligent, perceptive friends and critics and helped me maintain writing as a frequent discipline.

    As the year unfolds, I hope to blog more frequently about all of my interests, but you will probably notice that much of my blogging will focus on a more tightly focused set of themes. I have vague ideas for larger projects I want to get off the ground in 2013, so my blogging will undoubtedly converge around the issues involved in those. Expect more about those soon.

    Part of my resolve involves greater attention to my blog’s design and structure. You see some of the results of this process already in the change to my site’s layout. Also, my blog is now at its own domain, briancubbage.com (although it is still hosted and maintained in WordPress). I am my own worst critic when it comes to design, so the site may go through multiple facelifts in the coming weeks. Bear with me through this process; I promise that if the site looks different tomorrow, the content remains unchanged.

    One big change I am considering is to the name of this site, “Thought Required, Pants Optional.” While it is clever, it is also a tad flippant and doesn’t quite match the site’s content. (You shall search this site in vain for discussions, much less photos, of any “pants optional” event or activity.) Thoughts for a new title for my blog/site? Share a comment!

    Another resolve: I will promote the work of other writers whose work is important and deserves a wider audience. It’s not as if I have a terribly large platform from which to promote others, but that doesn’t matter. It’s not as much about getting more page views for people I like (although that is nice) as much as it is about acknowledging debts I owe. It is, deep down, a spiritual and intellectual discipline.

    So: 2013 will be a year of more blogging. I want to send a huge “thank you” to all of my current readers, as well as to all of those others who may not see this but to whom I still owe tremendous gratitude. You make it worthwhile.

  • Preaching with the Penis: An Evangelical on “Fornication”

    Preaching with the Penis: An Evangelical on “Fornication”

    Several years ago, back in 2005, long before most people reading this would have known me, I maintained a personal blog. It is long gone, its posts long since deleted and its very existence only recalled by perhaps three people (two of whom are related to one another). I devoted a fair bit of that blog to commentary on right-wing and evangelical Christian fatuousness. Part of why I gave up that blog was that I grew to find the task of keeping up with said fatuousness very tiresome. Besides, plenty of other people do this who are way, way better at commenting on evangelical excesses and folderol—its casual sexism, its tormented, kitschy relationship to culture, its rampant victim-blaming and tolerance for abuse, its apologias for rape—than I ever dreamed of being. Grace, Dianna Anderson, Sarah Moon, and Matthew Paul Turner immediately come to mind, and there are lots of others.

    I say this by way of preface for this post. I came across an opinion piece yesterday written for an evangelical Christian website, the Christian Post, that may be the single most baffling and (to the extent that I understand it) morally monstrous thing I have read in a long span of years, and that is saying something. (Let’s just say that I have read a lot of hideous stuff since 2008.) This piece comes via Stephanie Drury at Stuff Christian Culture Likes, another blogger who keeps an eye on evangelical fecklessness with insight, grace, and humor. As it deals with ethical and theological issues relating to sex and marriage, issues that have been a thematic interest for me of late, I couldn’t help but read this with a careful eye.

    The piece, “Premarital Sex?” is authored by Russell D. Moore, Dean of Theology at Southern Baptist Theological Seminary here in my very own Louisville. It is a re-post of a post originally on his own blog. (Moore is also, interestingly, at the nerve center of the evangelical movement to use international adoption as a religious conversion strategy.) In the piece, Moore argues for the thesis that Christians should reclaim the archaic and judgmental-sounding word “fornication” and use it in place of “premarital sex” to refer to sexual activity outside of marriage, all of which Moore presumes is without question morally and theologically impermissible.  The reason, broadly speaking, is that “fornication” better pinpoints the moral and theological considerations surrounding impermissible sexual activity better than “premarital sex” (and also, it turns out, better than other terms such as “adultery” that refer to other extramarital sex).

    That much is clear to me. But only about that much. The reasons provided for why anyone, Christian or not, should find the word “fornication” so apt remain difficult for me to understand. Seriously, I am scratching my head here. The reason, really, is that Moore’s argument embeds the notion of “fornication” in a broader sexual ethic that feels like it comes from another planet. I have conjectures about what this sexual ethic is and how it functions—hence why this post goes on—but I am still pretty flummoxed. Don’t take my word for this: read it yourself, please, and then come back so we can be confused together.

    *********

    Back? OK. (And seriously, thank you for returning.) The crux of Moore’s argument seems to be that “fornication” captures something about the specific wrongness of sex outside marriage that “premarital sex” doesn’t. In his own words:

    Fornication isn’t merely “premarital.” Premarital is the language of timing, and with it we infer that this is simply the marital act misfired at the wrong time. But fornication is, both spiritually and typologically, a different sort of act from the marital act. That’s why the consequences are so dire.

    In other words, “premarital sex” connotes that sex outside marriage and sex within it differ, not in kind, but instead merely in (temporal or spatial) location. Moore wants to convince us, though, that sex within marriage—or, to be more specific, “the one-flesh union of covenantal marriage,” which may not cover all marriages—differs in kind from sex outside of such a union. What accounts for this difference in kind? Moore continues:

    Fornication pictures a different reality than the mystery of Christ presented in the one-flesh union of covenantal marriage. It represents a Christ who uses his church without joining her, covenantally and permanently, to himself. The man who leads a woman into sexual union without a covenantal bond is preaching to her, to the world, and to himself a different gospel from the gospel of Jesus Christ. And he is forming a real spiritual union, the Apostle Paul warns, but one with a different spirit than the Spirit of Christ (1 Cor. 6:15, 19).

    This paragraph’s distinction between “fornication” and marital sex, I must be frank, reminds me of what philosopher Donald Davidson famously said about the language of “conceptual schemes” (a notion which itself has had a long life in evangelical circles in serious-sounding but opaque talk of “worldviews”): It sounds exciting and important so long as you don’t actually think about it. On its face, it seems to suggest that extramarital sex is bad because it is exploitative: to engage in it without a “covenantal and permanent” commitment is to “use” one’s partner, presumably for one’s own selfish gratification.

    At least I think this is the point: Moore never says here just what fornicators are using their partners for. This point seems to matter; it seems to matter quite a bit just why “using” one’s partner for sex is such a bad thing, especially in Christian contexts due to the long heritage within Christianity of ascribing nothing but instrumental value to sex within marriage (i.e. as a mere means to the end of reproduction). It is especially important in light of the fact that this instrumental view of sex in marriage often extends to a purely instrumental view of women in marriage. There is a widespread view that a key, perhaps the, role of a woman in marriage is thoroughly passive: she is to be sexually available for her husband, controlled by his decisions about sex, and (ideally) fertile and receptive to his seed. Maybe Moore himself subscribes to such a view of women. He seems to think that men who have extramarital sex “lead a woman into sexual union without a covenantal bond,” as if women who have extramarital sex somehow lack sexual agency, and he seems to think that especially worth mentioning that extramarital sex “preaches” “a different gospel” to the woman than the one of Jesus, without any apparent concern for what “gospel” the woman might be preaching to the man. Not only is this an inexcusably dim assessment of the inspiration women bring to the bedroom (heh heh), but it also implies, at least rhetorically, that men alone can preach, and when doing so to women they do so most eloquently and consequentially with their penises. And, to flesh out this distinction between “fornication” and marital sex, it isn’t enough just to say that, well, one kind of sex happens within marriage and the other doesn’t; Moore’s entire point is that the sex itself is intrinsically different, not just different in virtue of when and where in one’s life it happens. It is not just where the penis preaches its sermon, its choice of pulpit; it is what the penis actually says.

    What gives us a handle on this difference? The key, it seems, is Moore’s language of spiritual union. All sex, Moore seems to be saying, forms a “real spiritual union”; it is just that extramarital sex (sorry, I just can’t use the word “fornication” with a straight face and without scare quotes) forms a union “with a different spirit than the Spirit of Christ.” In other words, marital (covenantal) sex and extramarital sex are animated by, and perhaps themselves effectuate, different “spirits.” To have extramarital sex is to produce, or otherwise ally oneself with, spirits other than that of Christ. (Implied but not stated, I suspect, is the notion that spirits other than that of Christ are at best a waste of time and at worst adversaries of God and all that is good. My Southern Baptist forbears would, I think, shudder to think that the Dean of Theology at Southern Baptist Theological Seminary takes this kind of “spiritual warfare” talk seriously. But even so.)

    Other more subtle minds may have a better sense of the difference Moore is trying to describe here. I am a Christian, although I suspect Russell Moore would not think me one, and I can scarcely discern what he is after here. But whatever “spirit” is produced by extramarital congress, it is the sort of thing that produces the need to repent, and the locution “premarital sex” obscures that need:

    The language of “premarital sex” can enable a conscience to evade repentance. After all, if the problem is one merely of “timing” or of “waiting” then the problem is resolved once one is married. The event was in the past.

    So far, so good (I guess). Premarital sex, it appears, produces “spirits,” or at least associations with “spirits,” that can endure well into marriage, and one must repent from these spirits. This business of “spirits” supervening on sexual activity mystifies me, but at least I can sort of form an image in my mind of what it would be like for that to happen. But then Moore’s train leaves the rails, or at least any rails I can see, and he goes into regions where perhaps only he can follow. He continues to illustrate his point by contrasting (premarital) “fornication” with adultery:

    This makes fornication even more dangerous, in this sense, than adultery. Both fornication and adultery are acts of infidelity. But a man who has committed adultery, if he is repentant, understands something of how he’s broken trust, attacked a covenant. He can see that even when his wife has forgiven him, he must invest years in rebuilding trust. He can understand why his wife concludes that if he’ll cheat with one woman, why would he not cheat with another? He must work to show himself faithful.

    The fornicator can be deceived into thinking that marriage has solved the problem. He doesn’t see the ongoing nature of the problem. Often he finds it difficult to lead his wife spiritually, or to fully gain her trust. The root problem is a sin committed together, driving the couple apart.

    What to make of this passage? Let’s set aside my already-conceded deafness to whatever work “spirit” and “spiritually” are meant to be doing here and just focus, for a start, on the straightforward moral distinction Moore purports to make. It is surprising: contrary to plausible intuitions we might have, Moore contends that “fornication,” in his sense, is “more dangerous” (so, I suppose, worse?) than adultery. Setting to one side, for charity’s sake, that up to now his account had implied that “fornication” includes adultery as well as premarital sex, it seems that premarital “fornication” is worse somehow than marital infidelity.

    Why would anyone think that? Aside from the fact that, like half of any given issue of The Atlantic, Moore may be making a counterintuitive statement for no better reason than to get our attention, we get hints that for Moore “repentance” plays a decisive role. As he writes, “A man who has committed adultery, if he is repentant, understands something of how he’s broken trust, attacked a covenant.” The point seems to be that the adulterer, who has a marriage covenant but has strayed outside the shelter it provides, can turn his mind and heart back around to the Spirit of Christ at work in his marriage and do the hard work of guiding himself (and his wife, who still lacks any agency whatsoever and needs to be led) in the way that Spirit leads. He can turn back towards that covenant because he has a covenant to which to turn. But the (now-married) premarital fornicator, despite the fact that he has, we are encouraged to think, entered into a marriage covenant and is having licit marital sex, is kidding himself if he hasn’t also done this work of “repentance.” “The [premarital] fornicator can be deceived into thinking that marriage has solved the problem,” Moore says. “He doesn’t see the ongoing nature of the problem. Often he finds it difficult to lead his wife spiritually, or to fully gain her trust. The root problem is a sin committed together, driving the couple apart.”

    Obviously this “repentance” business is tough. It is far more than turning towards one’s wife and only having sex with her, forsaking all others (as the old rite in the Book of Common Prayer put it). You can do that in a marriage that (it seems) is sufficiently “covenantal” so as to sustain perfect sexual fidelity and still be kidding yourself if you don’t “repent.” What’s more, you drag your poor wife into your sin (who, remember, has no agency here and is only being led wherever you follow), turning it into a “sin committed together,” so long as you don’t—“repent.”

    What is this “repentance,” then? What does it look like? How do you do it? It would have to be something more than just saying “I repent,” right? Does one have to say it a certain way? Look a certain way when you say it? Lather, rinse, repeat? (Is it a performative that depends on repetition and reinforcement?) Whatever it is, it seems to be a key ingredient in a woman’s ability to trust that her husband will remain faithful. Women seem to lack spiritual and moral agency here, but they seem to be pretty darn distrustful. (O ye of little faith!) But wives know the score, it seems: If men who claim to be Christians nevertheless had premarital sex, nothing would stop them from adultery. Their distrust, otherwise spiritually debilitating and leaving them in need of constant moral and spiritual guidance, nevertheless harbors a critical insight, seen as it were from beneath, through snakes’ eyes: it is nothing less than Moore’s professed chief insight that premarital sex is no better than adultery because it testifies to a man’s lack of control over his libido. Premarital sex and adultery are, when reflected in the jaded gaze of distrustful femininity, two heads of the same beast:

    Moreover, she knows, especially if he professed to be a Christian before the marriage, that his libido is stronger than his conscience. If he’s able to justify his fornication, he will justify his adultery. They are not two separate things, but two different phases of the same thing: immorality in contrast to the self-giving and uniting covenant of marriage.

    So, here is where we are. Somehow, we are supposed to believe that an adulterer, who has (by definition) broken a promise he made before God and the world, but can “repent,” is somehow in a better position, morally and theologically, than someone who has had sex before marriage but who has committed to monogamy and not broken his covenant but failed to do something or other that signifies appropriate “repentance.”

    Let me set aside any purely assumed ignorance I might have taken on here and state flatly that Moore’s account fails to track any intuitions or sense of principle I possess. Moore and others sympathetic to his account would probably assert that this is simply my problem, that I am insufficiently “spiritual.” But if, at the end of all this, all Moore can say for himself is, like one of the moderators of the comment thread on Moore’s article wrote, in response to a commenter, “The evidence is within me by God’s Holy Spirit,” full stop, end of sentence, and the burden is on me to prove otherwise, this is simply mystifying at best and a rank appeal to arbitrary authority at worst. (Perhaps the evidence is “within” his pants?) I fail to imagine any moral magic trick that one could perform under the banner of “repentance” that would make the wrong of adultery, of breaking a promise you made to someone with whom you are supposed to share a special bond of intimacy and trust, somehow better and “less dangerous” than being in a committed monogamous marriage but not ashamed of having sex beforehand.

    Here is where my charity runs out and I can’t help but interject cynical explanations. (O me of little faith! Perhaps I am insufficiently manly, too feminine and distrustful?) If we can’t give a decent account, not only of what “repentance” is but why it has the power to work like a moral “Get Out of Jail Free” card to husbands who sleep around, it is hard to resist the conclusion that “repentance” pretty much gets to be whatever Christian married men say it is. Who in this scenario could tell them they are wrong? Certainly not their wives, of course, and what stake do the men themselves have in having transparent criteria around this? In other words, it seems a placeholder for male power, the right redounding to them in virtue of the unquestioned spiritual leadership they exercise over their wives.

    In fairness to Moore, it’s not as if he is saying men just get to do whatever they want. His recommended norm for male sexual behavior, after all, is rather strict, and his regime of “repentance” seems to be, at least in principle, something that is costly and difficult. Men, too, have to bend to the force of strict norms. The problem, though, is that, as so often happens under our current norms of gender, men are accorded a power and privilege over naming and adjudicating their own violations of these norms that women are not. As Simone de Beauvoir put it, men get the privilege of being “both judge and party to the case.” After all, Moore at least rhetorically implies that, whatever male “repentance” looks like, it entitles them to their wives’ forgiveness and to recognition of their rightful spiritual leadership. As he writes, “He [the husband] can see that even when his wife has forgiven him, he must invest years in rebuilding trust.” Not if his wife forgives him; there is no question that she will, she must, because his rightful place demands it. It is a matter of when, of how long it will take to overcome the sluggishness of her spiritual debility and learn to trust the message the husband’s penis is trying to preach to her through the fog of her doubt.

    Thus endeth the lesson of the penis.

    *********

    Fortunately there is, I think, a better Christian sexual ethic to be had. I don’t claim to have anything fully worked-out to share, but I am working on something. Watch in the coming days for some initial thoughts. In the meantime, what do you think? Feel free to leave me a comment!

  • A Poem: “Mariam”

    Mariam

    And she looked down at the little one,
    Her child, tired from her labor,
    Head and shoulders sagging under
    The armor and helm she wore,

    The baby in her arms wrapped in rags,
    Flecks of blood still in his hair.
    An ocean opened up inside her
    Of joy and grief commingled,

    Knowing beyond knowledge
    What awaits her and this child,
    But that she is of him, and he of her,
    And so then it was enough.

    The wind whistled through the stable cracks,
    Joseph, brave Joseph, who
    Had withstood so much ridicule, slept
    On the ground beside them.

    In the end, nothing could protect
    Them, not the stable walls, not
    Her armor, not Joseph. There would
    Be nothing but to love, and love hard.

    Bending down, there, in the dark,
    Mariam put her mouth
    Near the ear of the sleeping one,
    Kissed it, and whispered:

    “Looks like it is you and me, kid.”

  • Of Rock Star Gloves

    Of Rock Star Gloves

    I post a lot about my five-year-old son. I don’t talk about him much on my blog, but he is a regular fixture on my Facebook and Twitter accounts. What can I say? The kid is extremely entertaining, and I can never predict where he will end up once he gets started.

    Take this morning, for example. He crawls out of bed after I have been in the kitchen for a few minutes getting started on breakfast and packing his lunch. After asking what day it is (he does this most mornings) and some other chitchat, I turn to work on his lunch, when he says, “Dad! Dad! Look at me!”

    I turn around and he is standing on one foot, the other foot drawn halfway up off the ground, like a flamingo. His palms are pressed together at his chest in an obvious gesture of supplication. He is wobbling, trying to keep his balance. He looks at me and says, “Look, I am making a wish!”

    He then closes his eyes, still on one foot, and mutters something under his breath. Then he stomps his lifted foot down to the floor with a sweeping forward flourish, separates his hands, and looks back up at me with triumph.

    I stare back, unsure of quite what to say. I am unfamiliar with this wishing ritual and for a flash I think that it looks like some sort of quasi-Buddhist act like you might see in a cartoon. I also wonder whether I should ask what he wished for, but suspect it might be bad luck to do that. However, he eases this concern for me unprompted by asking, “Wanna know what I wished for?”

    “Of course!” I respond. “What did you wish for?”

    “Rock star gloves! For you!”

    Not at all what I expected. “For me? Why for me?”

    With a huge grin, he answers, “Because you look like a rock star!”

    I am, at the time he says this, wearing a plaid shirt of dark blue and red, shirt tail out, and a pair of khakis. I am a pair of bib overalls away from being dressed to host the 4:30 am farm report on TV. I am suddenly overwhelmed with gratitude that my darling son thinks that, even in my staid getup, I look like a rock star.

    He will not always look at me like that, of course. That is fine. Someday he will come to terms with the very real, very un-rock-star, very limited me. But for now, let me just imagine the creased leather of these rock star gloves on my fingers.

  • Devil Take The Hindmost: A Rant on the Politics of Marriage Equality

    Devil Take The Hindmost: A Rant on the Politics of Marriage Equality

    This morning, I encountered a brief post at ThinkProgress, “Conservative Pundits: Accepting Same-Sex Marriage is Common Sense.” The article relates remarks made by Mary Matalin and George Will on yesterday’s This Week with George Stephanopoulos to the effect that the popular politics surrounding marriage equality in the United States is trending inexorably towards widespread popular support for equality. The state-level victories for marriage equality in the 2012 elections, and public opinion charts like this one, tell the story.

    The tenor of the ThinkProgress article is positive: it means to say “look, marriage equality and LGBTQ rights are obviously advancing when even Mary Matalin and George Will admit publicly that marriage equality is coming.”

    But I am not so excited. This post inadvertently shows an ugly side to the politics of marriage equality, an ugly side others and I have feared would come. Read carefully what Mary Matalin actually said on Stephanopoulos:

    MATALIN:  There are important constitutional, biological, theological, ontological questions relative to homosexual marriage. People who live in the real world, say, the greater threat to the civil order are the heterosexuals who don’t get married and are making babies. That’s an epidemic in crisis proportions. That is irrefutably more problematic for our culture than homosexuals getting married. I find this important dancing on the head of a pin argument, but in real life, looking down 30 years from now, real people understand the consequences of so many babies being born out of wedlock to the economy and to the morality of the country.

    So. Is this how it is?

    We are going to begrudgingly accept marriage equality because, well, single parents and people who have children without being married are the real reason society is crumbling?

    Are queer folk so desperate for social acceptance that we are willing to purchase it from the likes of Mary Matalin at the expense of raising the age-old conservative specter of “out-of-wedlock” parents?

    Are we really going to nod in approval while Mary Matalin trots out conservative racist dog-whistling tropes? Are we so naive that we don’t understand that when Matalin is talking about rampant out-of-wedlock births, she is talking about blacks and immigrants, and especially single black women? Do we really want this kind of “help”?

    Are we really going to be content that Matalin has managed, intentionally or not, to link LGBTQ rights with conservative handwringing over the demographic shift away from whiteness that helped drive the 2012 elections?

    Are we now, just maybe, among the targets of demographic realignment that the Republican Party has in mind in order to overcome its narrowing base of straight white men?

    Are we really going to take whatever rights we get with marriage equality– rights that are going to come with a price tag— and then run? Are we really going to say “Devil take the hindmost” and forget to stand in solidarity with other queer folk for whom marriage is not a goal? With trans* folk, who still struggle for basic recognition of their identities under the law, with rampant discrimination in housing and employment, with harassment and violence? With immigrants, with organized labor, with the poor?

    Are we secretly glad that some conservatives are looking for someone else besides us for a change to target with their paranoia and their fear?

    Or are we going to resist this fearmongering? Are we going to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with all LGBTQ folk, with people of color, with immigrants? Are we going to listen to, affirm, and learn from one another’s stories? Are we going to learn to build coalitions that will help us resist being co-opted by the overwhelming forces of capital and compulsory heterosexuality?

    I sincerely hope it is the latter. I am certainly not against marriage equality. Quite the opposite, in fact. But the politics of it can very easily turn very ugly. I hope we are not starting to see that here.

  • The Coveted Kindergarten Endorsement Goes To…

    The Coveted Kindergarten Endorsement Goes To…

    I had a political discussion with my five-year-old on his way to school this morning. He had said a few days ago that his class was going to be voting for President, so I followed up on that.

    ME: Did your class vote for President?
    HIM: Yep.
    ME: Who did you vote for?
    HIM: (excited) Barack Obama!

    [ASIDE: While I am very political, I don’t burden my son with my politics. This is, in fact, the first political discussion we have ever had. So whatever enthusiasm he has for President Obama didn’t come from me. ]

    HIM, continued: He is a really good President. You wanna know why?
    ME: Sure. Why?
    HIM: (very serious and intense) Because he makes jobs for every kind of human.
    ME: (barely straight face) Oh that is good. He does sound like a good President. Who won?
    HIM: My class? Barack Obama!
    ME: (relieved) That is great! Hey, do you know who I am going to vote for?
    HIM: (genuinely curious) Who?
    ME: Barack Obama!
    HIM: (huge grin) That makes us twins! (We then high-five.)
    ME: Do you know who Mommy is going to vote for?
    HIM: (thinks) No.
    ME: I think Barack Obama too.
    HIM: (laughs) No she can’t! We’re twins. Do you know how many twins are?
    ME: Uhhhh… Four?
    HIM: No, two! Mommy can’t be twins. I think she is voting for Mitt Romney.

    So there it is, folks.

    I had contemplated writing a serious political post about why, all things considered, I think Barack Obama is the best choice, as well as what it says about our country that this election is even remotely close. (Hint: nothing particularly good.) But I will let my cute five-year-old’s endorsement stand in place of that.